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FREE TRADE VERSUS FAIR TRADE
JOHN STENCEL*
I. INTRODUCTION
Time and time again American farmers have been told the key to economic
freedom and prosperity is the export market. Since the mid-1980's, agribusiness,
politicians, commodity groups, processors and some farm groups have been
successful in tying agriculture's current and future prosperity to the export market.
Along with glowing forecasts of a sustained export-driven prosperity for
agriculture, the United States adopted the free market philosophy for agriculture.
Exports are important to agriculture. However, farmers and ranchers are only
being told part of the trade story. National Farmers Union policy (compiled and
voted on by grassroots producers)' says that the World Trade Organization
framework will perpetuate a never ending race to the bottom in producer
commodity prices, pitting farmer against farmer and country against country for
the one commodity all humans must have: food.2
II. Is THE FARMERS UNION OPPOSED TO FREE TRADE?
Farmers Union has always been a proponent of fair trade. As trade
agreements have been negotiated, and as federal farm policy has shifted to the
"free market" approach, Farmers Union has remained steadfast in its call for
fairness, accountability, and benchmarks for success in trade negotiations.
Farmers Union policy implies they support free trade, as long as it is fair trade.3
National Farmers Union supports a fair trade system that protects the
economic well-being, health and environmental concerns, working conditions and
labor rights of our country's producers as well as producers in all other countries. 4
In the race to become the world's least-cost producer, individual farmers and
ranchers are left to fend for themselves in global markets, while the processors and
consumers enjoy the benefits of cheap commodities.
*Past President of Rocky Mountain Farmers Union. With deep gratitude to Dr. Daryll E. Ray,
Agricultural Policy Analysis Center, The University of Tennessee, and Dale Enerson, Agriculture
Economist, North Dakota Farmers Union, for their many contributions.
1. NATIONAL FARMERS UNION, 2007 POLICY OF THE NATIONAL FARMERS UNION 8 (March 2-5,
2007), http://www.nfu.org/wp-content/2007_nfupolicy.pdf.
2. National Farmers Union, Farmers Union Says WTO Negotiations Bound to Fail, NATIONAL
FARMERS UNION NEWSROOM, July 24, 2006, available at http://nfu.org/news/2006/07/24/farmers-
union-says-wto-negotiations-bound-to-fail.html.
3. NATIONAL FARMERS UNION, supra note 1, at 41.
4. Id, at 115.
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After the breakdown of the World Trade Organization (WTO) negotiations in
2003, 5 the United States' trade negotiators have instead tried to complete free trade
agreements with many other countries and regions in bilateral and multilateral
agreements, namely the Dominican Republic-Central American Free Trade
67Agreement, the Australia Free Trade Agreement,7 and the Free Trade Area of the
Americas. 8  While each of these may seem to be minor in overall scope,
collectively they could do great damage to our country's agricultural economy.
Many times in recent years, Farmers Union has been a lone voice in the
agriculture community, the only purveyor of reason and perspective when it came
to agricultural trade. Yet, the influence of the free trade ideology continued to
grow and pervade our public policy decisions.
III. THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION
The World Trade Organization today leads much of the discussion of free
trade initiatives in the world. The United States and 150 other member countries
have joined together since 1995 in an effort to improve the trading climate and
opportunities in international markets. 9 The WTO replaced the GATT (General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) organization that had been working on trade
issues since the 1940s. 10
Since 1995, there have been major initiatives called "rounds" or "agendas" in
which member nations attempt to reach new trade agreements. There was the
Uruguay round of discussions in the 1990s, 11 and in recent years, the Doha Agenda
has been driving talks between nations. 2 Periodically, "ministerial" conferences
are held throughout the world to negotiate specific initiatives or rules. One of the
5. David Livshiz, Public Participation in Disputes Under Regional Trade Agreements: How
Much is Too Much-The Case for a Limited Right of Intervention, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 529,
530-31(2005) (discussing the importance of public participation in future free trade agreements).
6. Office of the United States Trade Representative, Central America-Dominican Republic-
United States Free Trade Agreement Final Text, (Aug. 5, 2004), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/CAFTA/CAFTA-
DRFinalTexts/SectionIndex.html [hereinafter CAFTA-DR].
7. Australian Government, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia-United States
Free Trade Agreement, (Jan. 1, 2005), available at
http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negotiations/usfta/final-text/index.htm [hereinafter A USFTA].
8. Free Trade Area of the Americas, Third Draft FTAA Agreement, (Nov. 21, 2003), available at
http://www.ftaa-alca.org/FTAADraft03/Index e.asp [hereinafter FTAA].
9. World Trade Organization, Members and Observers, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatis e/tif e/org6_e.htm.
10. World Trade Organization, The 128 Countries That Had Signed GATT by 1994, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/gattmem-e.htm. The WTO is headquartered in Geneva,
Switzerland, and functions not only to foster trade between its member nations, but also acts as the
dispute settler or arbitrator when nations disagree on trading practices. Its primary goal is the
liberalization of all kinds of trade by all of its members. World Trade Organization, What is the WTO?,
available at http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/whatise.htm.
11. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations,
Apr. 15, 1994,33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994).
12. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001,
WT/MIN(0 1)/DEC/I, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002).
VOL. 36:3/4
FREE TRADE VERSUS FAIR TRADE
most recent ministerial conferences was in Cancun, Mexico, in September 2003,13
but it ended in the failure of developed and developing countries to reach any
consensus on many agricultural trade issues. 
14
Prior to the Cancun talks, and especially since the talks failed, the United
States has also been negotiating with specific countries trying to achieve bilateral
trade agreements. The United States has negotiated agreements with Chile 15 and
Singapore, 16 and proposed agreements with Panama, Peru and other South
American countries. 17 The U.S. Trade Representative, appointed by the President
and working within the Commerce Department, primarily leads trade
negotiations. 18 However, most of our trade representatives have not had an
agricultural background, and have usually not understood the uniqueness of
agricultural commodity markets.
Very recently, twenty-one Asia-Pacific trade ministers discussed the Doha
round of trade liberalization negotiations in Cairns, Australia.1 9 There, the effort
focused on reviving the Doha round, which some have said is on its deathbed. 0
Ultimately, the United States trade representative stated that the Doha round would
never meet its development promise "unless and until there is sufficient new
market access in agriculture and manufacturing and services.'
IV. AREN'T EXPORTS THE KEY To AGRICULTURE'S SUCCESS?
For years, agri-businesses, processors, politicians, commodity groups and
some farm groups have perpetuated the belief that farmers and ranchers could
export their way to prosperity by allowing the free market, not government, to
negotiate agriculture and trade. American farmers and ranchers were told the key
to economic freedom is the export market.22 Many believed, and many still do,
that free and expanding trade through NAFTA and WTO, along with Fast Track
13. World Trade Organization, The Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/ministe/min03_e/min03_e.htm.
14. Ramesh Jaura, "Mixed Feelings" About the Debacle, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 15, 2003,
available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/socecon/bwi-wto/wto/2003/0915mixedfeelings.htm
(discussing the failure to resolve difference between rich and poor nations).
15. United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Chile, June 6, 2003, Temp. State Dep't No.
04-35, KAV 6375, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Trade-Agreements/Bilateral/Chile-FTA/Final-Texts/Section-lndex.html (last
visited Mar 1, 2008).
16. United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/new/ftalSingapore/final/2004-01 -15-final.pdf.
17. CITIZENS TRADE CAMPAIGN, MINIMAL 'FIXES' TO BuSH'S PROPOSED 'FREE TRADE'
AGREEMENTS, available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/FTAsminimalfixesfmal.pdf
18. Negotiating and Other Authority, Office of the United States Trade Representative, 19 U.S.C.
§ 2171(b)(l)-(c)(1)(C) (1988).
19. FarmPolicy.com, Doha: Lula Speaks Out, available at
http://www.farmpolicy.com/?p=382#more-382.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Neil Hamilton, Feeding Out Future: Six Philosophical Issues Shaping Agricultural Law, 72
NEB. L. REV. 210, 216 (1993).
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Authority (now called Trade Promotion Authority 23) and even "Freedom to
Farm,, 24 would liberate farmers to reap the rewards of the unfettered global market
place.
However, it was not the absence of good farm policy or the presence of bad
trade deals that were blamed for hurting farmers and ranchers. Rather, the
explanation was always an unforeseen aberration in the export market that could be
fixed with more free trade agreements and less government interference.
25
The most frequently touted solution for an ailing agricultural sector is
expanding trade for U.S. agricultural products.26 However, many times the export
problems we identify, and the free trade answers we seek, simply do not reflect the
realities of global trade or address the fundamental problems faced by American
agriculture. In addition, whenever we have negotiated fewer trade barriers in
foreign countries, we have usually opened the door to an even larger amount of
imports to compete with our production. Since many countries have lower
environmental standards and far lower wages for workers, we end up exporting
jobs and importing greater amounts of foreign products.
Let us beware of falling exports. One of the most persistent myths
surrounding "Freedom to Farm's" failure was that a collapse in the export market
undermined the farm bill's ability to work the way it was intended. 27 After the so-
called "collapse", commodity groups and politicians scurried about looking for
scapegoats. They wagged their fingers at state trading enterprises, decried not
using export enhancement programs, and called for further trade liberalization to
make up for losses suffered in the export crash.
The question is whether the export markets really collapsed. The answer
depends on how exports are defined. There seems to be some confusion between
export value, which is the dollar value of exports, and export volume, which
represents the quantity or amount of commodity exported.28  The difference
between the two is important.
Export values experienced a spike in 1996 due to higher commodity prices
around the time "Freedom to Farm" was enacted.29 Export values then dropped in
23. Hal Shapiro & Lael Brainard, Trade Promotion Authority Formerly Known as Fast Track:
Building Common Ground on Trade Demands More Than a Name Change, 35 GEO. WASH. INT'L L.
REv. 1 (2003).
24. Emergency Farm Financial Relief Act, Pub. L. No. 105-228, 112 Stat. 1516 (codified as
amended at 7 §§ 7201 note, 7212 (1998)).
25. See Daryll E. Ray, 1996 Farm Bill: A Pattern for Future Legislation or Failed Experiment. U.
OF TENN., AGRIC. POL'Y ANALYSIS CTR. [hereinafter APAC], Oct. 29-30, 2001, available at
http://www.agpolicy.org/ppap/pdf/01/nd.pdf.
26. Id. at 10.
27. Daryll E. Ray, Freedom to Farm: The Root of Current Farm-Related Problems, APAC, Dec.
3, 2005, available at http://agpolicy.org/weekcol/281 .html.
28. See Ray, 1996 Farm Bill, supra note 25, at 2, 6.
29. Thomas A. Fogarty, Freedom to Farm? Not Likely, USA TODAY, Jan. 1, 2002, at lB.
"Freedom to Farm" is the common name for the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of
1996.
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the latter part of the 1990s.3° However, one should not confuse export values with
export volumes, which have remained relatively constant. Export volumes have, in
fact, remained flat for nearly two decades compared to the volatility of export
values. 3"
However, even the spike and subsequent fall in export value that occurred
around the time of "Freedom to Farm" was really no more dramatic than
fluctuations in other years. In other words, the value "crash" that occurred was not
an unprecedented or even unforeseeable event.32 It was a market fluctuation, not a
cataclysmic fall. Therefore, a collapse in the export market did not cause the
failure of "Freedom to Farm."
Is the difference between value and volume significant? Distinguishing
between export values and volume challenges the U.S. trade mindset. Our current
agriculture and trade policy is built around opportunities in export values, but it is
also based on unrealistic expectations of future growth in export volume. We have
been talking apples when we should have been talking oranges. In simple terms, a
change in the value of our exports does not necessarily mean there has been a
change in the amount exported. Values may go up and down, but the quantity
traded may stay about the same.33
Export volumes were relatively flat even during the early days of "Freedom to
Farm.",34  When there was a spike in the value of exports, volume remained
constant.35 This is a significant point because it dramatically undermines the
current public policy mindset. Despite export volumes remaining flat for nearly
two decades, compared to the volatility of export values, 36 the United States has
highlighted opportunities in export values to build an agriculture and trade policy
based on an unrealistic expectation of future growth in export volume.
If the intent of our agriculture and trade policy is to increase export volumes
in order to reduce U.S. stocks, policymakers should take note of an interesting fact,
brought to light by economist Daryll Ray. Dr. Ray points out that the United
States has only experienced three periods of dramatically high export volume-
driven prosperity in the last century, after both world wars and once during the late
seventies.37 Exports remained strong into the early eighties, but have remained flat
ever since.38 Unfortunately, we have been waiting for over two decades for export
30. See Ray, supra note 25.
31. Id. at2.
32. See Daryll E. Ray, Year in Review: Dollars Drive Farm Bill Debate, APAC, Jan. 11, 2002,
available at http://agpolicy.org/articles02.html.
33. See Daryll E. Ray, Daniel G. DelaTorre Ugarto & Kelly J. Tiller, Rethinking U.S. Agriculture
Policy: Changing Course to Secure Farmer Livelihoods Worldwide, 17 fig.6, APAC, Sep. 12, 2003,
available at http://agpolicy.org/blueprint.html.
34. See id.
35. See id.
36. See id.
37. Daryll E. Ray, Corn Projections Have Been Too Optimistic, SOUTHWEST FARM PRESS, Nov.
16,2000.
38. See Daryll E. Ray, Farm Policy for Farmers Around the Globe: Are Subsidies the Cause or
Result of Low Crop Prices?, 16 fig.7, APAC, 2003.
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markets to rebound. In the meantime, the United States has based agriculture and
trade policy on events that occurred only three times in the last century.
Did exports slump due to a drop in demand caused by the Asian flu? No. It is
a myth that there was a "crash" of export markets caused by the accompanying
financial crisis. The commonly held belief is that demand dropped off in countries
affected by the epidemic, creating a domino effect that led to dramatically reduced
world demand, which, in turn, devastated our agricultural export markets. The fact
is that there was no drop-off in demand. World demand actually increased during
the Asian flu crisis.
39
Information gathered by Dr. Ray charts the rate of growth in domestic
demand for agricultural products during the Asian flu crisis. 40  Dr. Ray's
information shows that during this period of financial instability demand increased,
not decreased, in both the eight Asian countries experiencing crisis and the rest of
the world.4'
What is the difference when there are drops in demand and surges in supply?
Grain markets were in distress during the years of the Asian flu crisis, but it was
not a slump in demand caused by the epidemic. Dr. Ray suggests it was a supply
surge that caused market disruption,42 a different problem altogether.
Differentiating between market disruptions caused by increased supply rather
than decreased demand is significant. They are very different problems. Dr. Ray
explains that a slump in demand is short term and the market will return when the
economy recovers.43 When the economically troubled countries begin to recover,
they will once again be able to purchase agricultural products.
However, if the problem is a supply surge like that which the United States
experienced during the same period as the Asian flu crisis, it is a longer-term
problem. The market will not recover quickly because excess supply will not clear
quickly from the market, even when prices fall. The resulting circumstance is that
supplies overhang the market for prolonged periods, regardless of the economic
health of importing nations.
There is a problem with "over supply." Supply surges and increased
production can be problems for American farmers because they usually mean less
export opportunities for the U.S.44 This problem impacts both U.S. customers and
competitors. If the United States' export customers increase their domestic
production, they will have less need to buy U.S. products. If, at the same time, the
39. See Daryll E. Ray, Year in Review: The Asian Crisis Was Not the Culprit in Farm
Price/Income Problems, APAC, Dec. 21, 2001, available at http://agpolicy.org/weekpdf/075.pdf.
40. See Daryll E. Ray, News Flash: World Demand for Grain Increased During the Years of
Asian Crisis, APAC, May 18, 2001, available at http://agpolicy.org/weekcol/045.html.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See generally Daryll E. Ray, The Importance of International Supply Growth, APAC, July 13,
2001, available at http://agpolicy.org/weekcol/052.html.
44. See Ray, supra note 39.
VOL. 36:3/4
FREE TRADE VERSUS FAIR TRADE
export competitors increase their production, especially those that carry minimal
stocks or use export subsidies, they will capture an even greater U.S. market share.
During the years of the Freedom to Farm Act and the 2002 Farm Bill, free
trade ideologues frequently identified overproduction as a key problem and cited
the need to "increase" exports as a way to deal with depressed prices.45 They
argued that free markets would eventually reduce supply by forcing the least
productive land out of production. 46 However, free markets do not reduce supply
sufficiently to raise price in a timely fashion.
Citing "overproduction" as a problem in agriculture is an oversimplification.
This characterization is unfortunate because it places the burden on the farmer
rather than on the public policies that have driven producers to seek maximum
production levels in the first place. It is domestic farm policy and trade
agreements that create the problem, not farmers producing their crop. United
States farmers produce their crops, perhaps, better than any farmer anywhere in the
world does. They should not be penalized for being good at what they do.
Given the current structure of markets and distribution, farmers need an
inventory control mechanism. This not only keeps stocks from flooding the
market in times of low prices, but also allows them to have stock on hand to sell
when prices are high. Domestic farm policy has resisted this concept because
supply management is considered an anathema to the free trade marketplace.
Changing the prevailing free trade mentality about stock control mechanisms
is a challenge because of negative perceptions abound. Arguments against such
mechanisms claim that stock control programs that prevent farmers from
benefiting from high prices are too expensive, are useless because private trade
will hold stocks anyway, and that farmers cannot store their way to prosperity.48
Statistical information indicates that when prices are high, yields are often
low. 49 Without a reserve, farmers are unable to benefit from high prices because
they do not have anything to sell. Their entire product has been pushed onto the
open market, where U.S. stocks overhang the world market and put the U.S. in the
unfortunate position of being a residual supplier. 0
The pendulum now seems to be swinging back and inventory management
options, formerly called supply management, are again being considered in public
policy circles. In a 2002 statement by President George W. Bush regarding the
implementation of steel tariffs, which have been subsequently ruled illegal by the
WTO and discontinued, he laid the groundwork for future inventory management
programs: he called for restoring market forces to world steel markets by initiating
an international discussion to encourage the reduction of excess global steel
45. See Ray et al, Rethinking U.S. Agriculture Policy, supra note 33, at 15-19.
46. Id. at 16, 36.
47. Id. at 6, 44.
48. See generally Daryll E. Ray, Colloquia, Farm Policy's Historical Roots and Modern
Influences, APAC, Mar. 13, 2007, available at http://agpolicy.org/present07.html.
49. See Ray, Rethinking U.S. Agriculture Policy, supra note 33, at 18.
50. Id. at 24.
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capacity. 51 That sounds very much like a concession to farm policy advocates like
Farmers Union, who have called for farmer-owned inventory management
options.
5 2
As we write the new Farm Bill, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union urges future
farm programs to include an income support mechanism that includes an inventory
management system to bolster farm prices for producers. 
53
V. INSTEAD OF TRYING TO SELL EXCESS COMMODITIES TO THE WORLD, COULD WE
PRODUCE ENERGY INSTEAD?
In the past several years, a growing share of agricultural production has been
diverted into energy production through ethanol, biodiesel, and other renewable
fuels. At one time in our agricultural history, a large portion of production on a
typical farm was energy crops (in the form of feed grains and hay) raised for
feeding horses and other draft animals.
5 4
While these energy crops are very positive for American agricultural markets
and certainly have the benefit of reducing our country's dependence on foreign oil,
it is important to note that they are not exports using supplies of commodities, but
rather creative economic development encouraging further domestic demand. In
addition, further economic benefits could be realized by increasing livestock
enterprises using the high quality by-products of energy production. After making
ethanol from a bushel of corn, you still are left with nearly a bushel of feed as a by-
product.
Passage of a federal energy bill with a significant renewable fuels standard
would create a much more consistent demand for agricultural commodities than
the export market. Expensive energy prices, while a concern for both consumers
and agricultural producers alike, will enhance demand for renewable fuels
produced from our agricultural commodities.55
One of the concerns of the energy industry is: if we become more dependent
on ethanol and biodiesel, will the necessary supplies of feedstocks be available
when weather or other production problems occur? A system of farmer owned
"energy reserves" may help alleviate concerns about a steady supply, and would
help avoid the boom and bust cycles.56
51. See Press Release, President George W. Bush, President Announces Temporary Safeguards
for Steel Industry (Mar. 5, 2002) available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/03/print/20020305-6.html.
52. See 2007 Policy of the National Farmers Union, 105th ANNIVERSARY DELEGATE
CONVENTION, Fla., Mar. 2007, at 13.
53. Kent Peppler, President, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, Statement at the U.S. Senate Agric.
Comm., Concerning U.S. Food & Farm Policy and Development of 2007 Farm and Food Policy
(Mar. 12, 2007).
54. See VACLAV SMIL, ENERGY IN WORLD HISTORY, 71-73, Westview Press (2003).
55. See generally Daniel G. De La Torre Ugarte, Marie E. Walsh, Hosein Shapouri, & Stephen P.
Slinsky, The Economic Impacts of Bioenergy Crop Production on US Agriculture, APAC (2003).
56. See Peppler, supra note 53.
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The new Farm Bill also gives us an opportunity to look at farmer-owned
energy reserves through a community-based strategic biofuels program. The
establishment of a farmer-owned commodity loan would give farmers a tool to
empower themselves, on a voluntary basis, and could help them influence market
prices and protect against years of poor crop production.57
VI. WHY WON'T AGRICULTURAL MARKETS SELF-CORRECT?
Simple economics instructs that markets will self-correct. However,
agricultural markets are "inelastic" and not as responsive as other industries. In
other words, the market will not find a price low enough to clear excess
production.
In non-agricultural markets, oversupply will generally cause prices to fall.
Falling prices simultaneously increase the quantity demanded and reduce
production until supply diminishes. Reduced supply, in turn, eventually spurs an
increase in prices once again. Agricultural markets, however, do not work the same
way. 58 Excess supply is not cleared from the market in a timely manner.
So why does it not work in agriculture? Under a purely academic model,
production and supply drop in times of low prices.5 9 If agriculture worked like
other economic models, low prices would mean that producers would stop
producing. However, in the real world that is not what happens. A farmer is going
to produce when prices are high because he can make a profit, but he will also
produce when prices are low in order to spread his high fixed costs over as many
bushels as possible in an attempt to break even.
Low prices, according to the academic model, should also stimulate
demand .60 But, again, agriculture is unique. In most sectors of the economy,
consumers take advantage of low prices and deplete inventories. For example, if
there are too many TV's in the supply pipeline and prices fall, consumers will
likely take advantage of the lower prices and buy an additional TV for the family
room or kitchen, thereby reducing the stock. However, with food, demand stays
relatively flat. Consumers may shift their diets to different foods depending on the
price, but they probably will not eat more. In other words, if the price of food
declines, people may switch from hot dogs to steak, but they will not start eating
six meals a day instead of three.
Because agriculture is a unique economic enterprise, it is also a unique policy
challenge. If agricultural policy is confined to economic models and free market
ideology rather than the reality of the agriculture market, then independent
producers will continue to struggle. Those who survive one crisis will most likely
fall victim to the next crisis.
57. See id.
58. See Ray, Farm Policy's Historical Roots and Modern Influences, supra note 48, at 27 fig.7
(2003).
59. Robert Schenk, The Supply Curve, OVERVIEW: MODEL OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND, (2007),
available at http://www.ingrimayne.com/econ/DemandSupply/Supply3.html; NetMBA, Supply and
Demand, ECONOMICs (2007), available at http://www.netmba.com/econ/micro/supply-demand/.
60. Id.
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VII. Do INCREASED EXPORTS MEAN HIGHER COMMODITY PRICES?
Not necessarily. Despite the commonly held belief that greater exports
translate into higher prices paid to our farmers, reality tells a different story. For
example, our government cites increases in U.S. corn exports to Mexico as proof
of NAFTA success. 61 In addition, the United States Trade Representative (USTR)
reports, "[s]ince NAFTA was approved in 1993, United States agricultural exports
to Mexico have nearly doubled. Mexico import[ed] $6.5 billion of United States
agricultural products [in 2000], making it our third largest agricultural market." 62
USTR also points out that sales of U.S. corn to Mexico have increased eighteen-
fold under NAFTA.63 Thus, if the purpose of expanding trade and increasing U.S.
exports is to benefit U.S. producers, one could safely assume that such dramatic
success in corn exports to Mexico under NAFTA would translate into higher prices
paid to U.S. farmers.
In fact, corn prices have dropped since NAFTA went into effect even though
corn exports to Mexico have increased eighteen-fold. 64 Reduced production from
2003, and competition from higher priced oilseeds in 2004, has been the main
reasons for increased corn prices.65 In addition, since 2004, corn prices have
increased due to greater ethanol production in this country.66 Farmers and
ranchers should be asking why the dramatic success in corn exports to Mexico
under NAFTA have not translated into higher prices paid to U.S. farmers.
Farmers and ranchers have learned that our export competitors are as adamant
about keeping their export markets as we are, and if we want to increase our sales
abroad, we usually have to lower the U.S. commodity price to do so. It has been
this drive for lower market clearing prices that has made the export market
profitable for exporting companies but not necessarily for agricultural producers.
Do free trade agreements provide increased opportunities in developing
nations? Proponents of new trade agreements and expanded trade often cite
developing nations, where almost all income growth is spent on food, as an
opportunity for U.S. export growth.67 It is supposed that domestic demand grows
faster in developing nations and that there is less growth in domestic agricultural
61. U.S. Dep't. of State, Bureau of Int'l Info. Programs, NAFTA Agricultural Trade an
Unqualified Success, U.S. Official Says: Agreement serves as building block for all trade liberalization
(Apr. 20, 2004) available at http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-
english/2004/April/20040420172550ASrelliM0.3547937.html.
62. U. S. TRADE REP., NAFTA GOOD FOR FARMERS, GOOD FOR AMERICA (June 6, 2001),
available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/Fact-Sheets/2001/NAFTA_Good-forFarmers,-Goodfor-A
merica.html.
63. Id.
64. Daryll E. Ray, Mexico and Corn, APAC, Sept. 5, 2003, available at
http://agpolicy.org/weekco/l61. html.
65. Andrew Tanzer, Something's Up Down on the Farm, KIPLINGER'S PERSONAL FINANCE, vol.
61, No. 11, Nov. 2007, at 57-58.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., U.S. TRADE REP., CAFTA FACTS: MEETING THE NEEDS OF THE REGION'S RURAL
POOR: CAFTA RECOGNIZES SENSITIVITIES AND EXPANDS NEW OPPORTUNITIES (May 2005).
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production than in developed countries.68 However, developing nations do not
show a lot of promise as a source of export growth because they often experience
less domestic demand than developed countries. 69 In fact, the average annual rate
of growth in domestic demand for grains and seeds is decreasing in developing
countries and domestic production is increasing at a faster rate than demand. 70 It is
actually developed nations whose domestic demand is growing. 7'
Recently, developing nations of the world accused the U.S. of "exporting
poverty' 72 because we no longer manage our supply and have no effective floor
price under commodity prices. In fact, the United States and Europe can sell large
quantities of cheap products into world markets, and rely on government programs
to absorb some of the economic loss to producers.
In April, 2004, the WTO issued a preliminary finding that shows the U.S.
cotton support mechanisms, including direct payments, counter-cyclical payments,
crop insurance subsidies, and incentive payments made to cotton end users to
encourage the use of U.S. produced cotton, are illegal under current trading rules.
73
The complaint was filed by Brazil, and while the United States will likely appeal
the final ruling, it is an indication that the rest of the world, particularly developing
countries, views the 2002 Farm Bill and some of its supports as being trade
distorting.
7 4
While this new WTO ruling applies only to cotton, there are many other
commodity support programs for other products that may be challenged in the
future. In fact, Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lulada Silva recently stated that "a
U.S. offer to limit agricultural subsidies to US $17 billion was 'absurd'," and
added that, "Brazil's decision.. .to drop out of preliminary talks in the World Trade
Organization's Doha round of negotiations symbolized the end of Brazilian
subservience' to the industrial countries. 75
68. Id.
69. See Daryll E. Ray et al, Rethinking US. Agricultural Policy: Changing Course to Secure
Farmer Livelihoods Worldwide, APAC, 27-30, Sept. 12, 2003, available at
http://www.agpolicy.org/pub03.html.
70. See U.N. FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. (FAO) ECON. & SOCIAL DEP'T, FAO REPORT: ENOUGH FOOD
IN THE FUTURE- WITHOUT GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS §2 & §9 (Apr. 2000).
71. Stacey Rosen & Shahla Shapouri, Rising Food Prices Intensify Food Insecurity in Developing
Countries, AMBERWAVES, Feb. 2008, available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/AmberWaves/February08/Features/RisingFood.htm.
72. See Daryll E. Ray, International Producer Groups Offer a Competing Proposal for WTO Ag
Negotiations, APAC, June 27, 2003, available at http://www.agpolicy.org/weekco/1I 51 html.
73. See Daryll E. Ray, Cotton Trade Dispute Ruling Released: U.S. Must Make Changes,
SOUTHWEST FARM PRESS, Dec. 2, 2004, available at
http://southwestfarmpress.conmag/farming-cotton-tmde dispute_2/,
74. William Krist, Trade Policy and the Farm Bill, WOODROW WILSON CENTER, presented on
July 16, 2007.
75. Keith Good, DOHA: Lula Speaks Out, FARMPOLICY.COM, July 3, 2007, available at
http://www.farmpolicy.com/?p=382#more-382.
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VIII. Do OUR FARM PROGRAMS CAUSE POVERTY IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD?
Since the U.S. government no longer has any control over the amount of
agricultural production through acreage constraints or inventory management,
some countries of the world have accused us of "exporting poverty" to the rest of
the world. 76
According to Dr. Ray, the U.S. has historically had both apolicy ofplenty and
a policy of managing plenty.77 Our policy of plenty includes ongoing public
support to expand agricultural productive capacity through research, extension
programs, and other means to encourage more production. 78 We also have ample
evidence that our yields have increased as well as our costs.
In the past, our policy of managing plenty included mechanisms to manage
capacity and to compensate farmers for consumers' accrued benefits of
productivity gains.79 We have dropped the "managing plenty" part of our farm
programs, mostly since 1996, with no floor under commodity prices (marketing
loans and loan deficiency payments); no effective control of crop mix and acreage
(planting flexibility and no acreage set-asides); no price stabilization to producers
(no reserves or long-term loans). 80
Economic theory should then dictate that, as producers (both in the U.S. and
in the rest of the world), no longer finding it profitable to produce commodities at
the resulting low prices (without subsidies) should either raise different crops
(likely also in surplus) or go out of business. The operating assumption behind
such logic is that if subsidies were eliminated, production would decrease, and then
farmers worldwide would benefit from improved commodity prices.
The key question then is "will freeing up trade rules and eliminating farm
subsidies result in better prices?" A World Bank Report titled 2004 Global
Economic Prospects: Realizing the Promise of the Doha Agenda prescribes the
nearly total elimination of supports in the European Union and the United States.
81
In a related study of the possible effects of this scenario, the International Food
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) estimates that corn prices worldwide would
increase a whopping 2.9% after twenty years and that wheat prices would "soar"
up by 0.8%. 82
These predictions assume that the European Union countries would reduce
their production of wheat, oilseeds, and other grains by 63%, as the comparative
76. See TIM JOSLING ET AL., THE 2007 US FARM BILL: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, INTERNATIONAL FOOD AND AGRIC. TRADE POL'Y COUNCIL 3-4 (Sept. 2007).
77. See Ray et al., Rethinking U.S. Agricultural Policy, supra note 69, at 15-16 & 54 (App. A).
78. Id. at 54 (App. A).
79. See Id. at 15 & 54 (App. A).
80. See Id. at 16-17.
81. See CARLOS A. PRIMO BRAGA, 2004 GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS: REALIZING THE
PROMISE OF THE DOHA AGENDA, WORLD BANK REPORT 48 (Nov. 11, 2004).
82. Diaz-Bonilla Eugenio et al., Food Security and the World Trade Organization: A Typology of
Countries, AGRICULTURAL TRADE LIBERALIZATION: POLICIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA
333-360 (Marcos S. Jank ed., Inter-American Development Bank 2005).
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advantage would be for other countries with lower costs to raise these
commodities. Agricultural markets do not always respond the way other markets
do, nor the way economists or trade negotiators think they will. It is highly
unlikely that much land would be left idle and that these European countries,
which have lived through previous famines, would choose to be dependent on
other countries for vital foodstuffs. Likewise, history has shown that in the U.S.,
farmland is always used to produce something, and producers will not choose to let
major acreage remain idle even at fairly low prices.
So, it would seem that just eliminating trade barriers and eliminating subsidies
would not result in significantly higher prices for farmers in developing countries
or anywhere else in the world. This may be a key point that our negotiators have
missed. The high subsidy levels in the U.S. and Europe are the result of low
prices, not the cause of low prices. Once we, and more importantly our trade
negotiators, understand this concept, it is not so easy to reach the conclusion that
the simple elimination of subsidies will bring better crop prices to all farmers of
the world.
IX. SHOULD WE RELY ON PROJECTIONS TO DEVELOP PUBLIC POLICY?
Overly ambitious projections are a problem when it comes to determining
agriculture and trade policy. In 1996, price projections showed farmers receiving
high commodity prices for years to come; however, those projections did not even
last the growing season. 84 Wheat closed at $7.16 in April 1996 when the FAIR
Act was signed. 85 Six weeks later, the price of wheat had fallen to $5.00.86 With
the exception of soybeans, which peaked in 1997, crop prices for eight major crops
reached their record highs before the first crop year governed by Freedom to
Farm. 87
Trade projections were also inflated. At the time The FAIR Act was under
consideration, projectionists generally held that more free international trade,
especially with China, would launch U.S. agriculture onto an export-driven path of
sustainable prosperity. 88 For example, in 1996 China was projected to import 260
million bushels of corn in the year 1999. However, in reality they exported over
400 million instead.89
83. See generally Daryll E. Ray, Is it as Simple As: EU Lowers Farm Tariffs, U.S. Benefits?,
APAC, Oct. 28, 2005 available at http://agpolicy.org/weekcol/273.html.
84. Ray, 1996 Farm Bill, supra note 25, at Introduction.
85. Daryll E. Ray, Impacts of the 1996 Farm Bill, Agric. Pol'y Analysis Center, APAC, at 9 (Feb.
2001), available at http://agpolicy.org/farmbill.html.
86. Id.
87. See Ray, 1996 Farm Bill, supra note 25.
88. See DOUG BANDOW, TRADE WITH CHINA: BUSINESS PROFITS OR HUMAN RIGHTS?, (Cato
Center for Trade Policy Studies 2000), available at http://www.freetrade.org/node/198.
89. See FRED GALE, SUBSIDIZING CORN EXPORTS HELP PRICES REBOUND 14 (Econ. Res.
Service/USDA, DIANE Publishing) (2001), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/wrs012/wrs0l2e.pdf.
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X. THAT MONOPOLY "UP NORTH"
In February 2002, North Dakota farmers received mixed results from their
lengthy battle for trade justice. The findings of the North Dakota Wheat
Commission's Section 301 case indicated that the Canadian Wheat Board was
engaged in trade distorting practices; however, the Canadian Wheat Board took no
action to remedy U.S. farmer's concems. 90 Since that first decision, a 14% tariff
has been imposed on incoming hard red spring wheat imports, but no tariff was
imposed on durum wheat. 91 Although one can attribute some of the differences to
currency rate changes, the tariffs have slowed the flow of Canadian wheat and
durum dramatically.
92
It is interesting to note that while the North Dakota media reported a victory,
the Canadian media also reported victory, once again claiming vindication for the
much-maligned Canadian Wheat Board.93 There are few greater examples of a
free trade whipping post for American wheat producers than the Canadian Wheat
Board. Critics maintain that as a state trading enterprise, it is an anathema to free
trade, and often blame it for the dismal situation in durum. 94 Indeed, the flood of
Canadian durum has most likely contributed to driving down U.S. domestic
prices.
95
Politically, the Canadian Wheat Board is a popular and easy target for
disgruntled farmers and frustrated politicians. However, is it the Canadian Wheat
Board, or the trade agreements, that have put American farmers at a disadvantage?
It may seem like the simple answer, but eliminating the CWB probably will not
solve our problems and could even make them worse. Without individual western
Canadian farmers being required to sell their wheat to the Wheat Board, there
would be a flood of grain sold in the U.S. bordering states by individual producers
and local elevators instead of one state trading enterprise.
Do we need price transparency? Yes. Do we need to address currency
fluctuations? Absolutely. Do we need tariff rate quotas (TRQs) on Canadian
durum? Without a doubt. In fact, several trading partners use TRQs on U.S.
products, 96 highlighting its appropriateness. Our own government recently
90. Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, USTR Chief Ag Negotiator to go to North Dakota
to Hear Concerns of Wheat Farmers Regarding Monopolistic Canadian Wheat Board (March 28, 2002).
91. RANDY SCHNEPF, U.S.-CANADA WHEAT TRADE DISPUTE, CRS Report for Congress,
RL32426, at 12 (2004), available at www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RL32426.pdf.
92. North Dakota Union Farmer, Tariffs Imposed on Canadian Wheat", June Edition, 2002
[hereinafter North Dakota Union Farmer].
93. Press Release, Canadian Wheat Board, U.S. Wheat Tariff Comes Off, NAFTA Victory
Complete For Western Canadian Farmers (March 1, 2006) (on file with The DJILP).
94. See Wheat Board Elections Favour Pro-Monopoly Candidates, CANADIAN BROADCAST
CENTER, Dec. 12, 2006, available at http://www.cbc.ca/canada/saskatchewan/story/2006/12/l 1/wheat-
board.html; see also JOHN HOEVEN, TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE JOHN HOEVEN PRESENTED AT
THE U.S. INT'L TRADE COMMISSION 1 (State of N.D. 2003), available at
http://govemor.state.nd.us/media/news-releases/2003/09/docs/030904.pdf.
95. North Dakota Union Farmer, supra note 93, June Edition, 2002.
96. See DAVID W. SKULLY, ECONOMICS OF TARIFF-RATE QUOTA ADMINISTRATION, MARKET
AND TRADE ECONOMICS DIVISION I (Econ. Res. Service/USDA 2001), available at
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implemented TRQs on steel and lumber when it determined that other countries
were using unfair trading practices to dump those products into the U.S. market.97
TRQs could be an accepted and measured remedy to trade distorting practices.
However, the free trade agreements, not the Canadian Wheat Board, are at the
root of US/Canadian trade disputes. We need to go straight to the heart of the
problems in agriculture by addressing unfair trade agreements and market
concentration. We would be wise to direct our efforts toward the end rather than
chasing our tails about the Canadian Wheat Board.
XI. THE NAFTA SHUFFLE
U.S. exports to Canada and Mexico have grown under NAFTA, but imports
to the U.S. from Canada and Mexico have grown much faster. 98 Even though
USDA recognizes that imports have grown under NAFTA, our government
downplays their significance. During the NAFTA years, the U.S. NAFTA trade
surplus in agricultural products declined by 71%. 99 Before NAFTA, (1991 to
1994) the agricultural surplus with Canada and Mexico increased by $203
million. 100 During NAFTA, (1994 to 2000) the surplus fell by $1.5 billion.'0 '
The agricultural product-trade surplus with NAFTA countries has declined
more rapidly than the overall U.S. trade surpluses in agricultural products. It fell
from $1.6 billion in 1995 to $456 million in 2000 (a 70.7%) drop. 10 2 In fact, there
were two years of outright U.S. agriculture trade deficits with NAFTA countries in
1995 and 1999.103
In 1989, competitive imports (meaning those that replace crops grown in the
U.S.) "were 38% of U.S. export levels and 71% of all U.S. agricultural
imports."' 104 Based on 2000 data, "competitive imports were 60% of U.S. export
sales and represented 80% of all U.S. agricultural imports." 10 5 The increase in
competitive
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/tbl 893/.
97. Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, U.S. Outlines Process for Steel Safeguard
Exclusions (July 3, 2002), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/Press-Releases/2002/July/US-Outlines-Process-for SteelSaf
eguard_Exclusions.html?ht-.
98. PARR RosSON & FLYNN ADCOCK, THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT;
DEEPENING ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AND RESPONSE TO COMPETITION 2-3 (Center for N. Am. Stud.
2003), available at http://cnas.tamu.edu/publications/WEAINAFCNAS.PDF.
99. MARK GEHLHAR ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC, GLOBAL GROWTH, MACROECONOMIC
CHANGE, AND THE U.S. AGRICULTURAL TRADE I (Econ. Res. Service, USDA, 2007), available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/err46/err46.pdf.
100. Elizabeth Henderson, Why the National Campaign for Sustainable Agriculture Should Take on
Free Trade Agreements, 10 COMMUNITY, FOOD, & AGRIC PROGRAM NEWS 1, 1 (2002), available at
http://media.cce.comell.edu/hosts/agfoodcommunity/fap/newsletter/CFAPfalI02.pdf.
101. ROSSON & ADCOCK, supra note 98, at 3.
102. PUBLIC CITIZEN, DOWN ON THE FARM 7 (2002), available at
http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACFF2.PDF.
103. Id.
104. Id. at ii.
105. Id.
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imports means that we are now in the unfortunate position of trying to export our
imports.
XII. TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA)
Early in his term, President George W. Bush signed a bill containing Trade
Promotion Authority (TPA), previously called Fast Track. 106 A major legislative
priority for President Bush, proponents touted the TPA as creating "more good
jobs for American workers, more exports for American farmers, and higher living
standards for American families." 10 7 TPA essentially allows the trade negotiators
and/or the administration to craft trade agreements knowing that Congress cannot
modify any provisions to the document, but can only vote to approve or disapprove
the document in its entirety.
Present and past administrations have maintained TPA was necessary because
other countries were not willing to seriously negotiate with the United States if
Congress could change agreements. 10 8 The Bush Administration argued that
because TPA (Fast Track) was not re-authorized in 1994, the U.S. had missed out
on many preferential trade agreements that other countries had negotiated without
us. 0 9 Specifically, the administration informed farmers and ranchers that without
TPA, the United States would be further excluded from trade, resulting in
agriculture losing out on numerous export opportunities.°"0
Despite the fact that the U.S. has negotiated hundreds of trade deals without
TPA (in both the Clinton Administration and the Bush Administration, totaling
roughly 300 separate trade agreements without Fast Track),"' the trade
agreements negotiated under Fast Track, like NAFTA and CUSTA, have not been
favorable to U.S. agriculture. Implementing a procedure that will increase the
likelihood of more agreements like NAFTA does not seem prudent to Farmers
Union.
In recent years, proposed Free Trade Agreements have been negotiated with
Chile, Singapore, Thailand, Central American countries, the Dominican Republic
106. David Firestone, Senate Grants Bush Authority on Trade Deals, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2002, at
Al.
107. Press Release, The White House, President Signs Trade Act of 2002 (August 6, 2002),
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020806-4.html.
108. BUREAU OF OCEANS & INT'L ENVTL. & Sci. AFF., TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY FACT
SHEET (2002), available at http://www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/fs/2002/12953.htm.
109. Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, Statement from U.S. Trade Representative Robert
Zoellick on House Passage of the Trade Promotion Authority Bill (July 7,2002), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/Document Library/Press_.Releases/2002/July/Statement fromUSTradeReprese
ntativeRobert B ZoellickonHousepassage of theTradePromotionAuthoritybill.html?ht=.
110. See Nat'l Coin Growers Ass'n, NCGA's Hume Speaks with Agriculture Secretary, Trade
Ambassador on TPA, 9 CORN COMMENT. 24 (2002), available at
http://www.ncga.com/news/CC/volume9/ccVo19n24.html.
11. Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, Statement of U.S. Trade Representative Susan C.
Schwab regarding the Expiration and Renewal of Trade Promotion Authority (June 29, 2007), available
at
http://www.ustr.gov/Document-Library/Press-Releases/2007/June/Statement-by-US-Trade-Represent
ativeSusanCSchwabregardingtheexpiration renewal ofTradePromotionAuthority.html.
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(CAFTA), and Australia (AFTA).112 The U.S. is also attempting to negotiate a
Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). 113 In most of these countries, the
demand for U.S. agricultural products is low, while the opportunity to sell foreign
agricultural goods into our markets is considerably higher. In most of these
agreements, trade negotiators often cite the demand in foreign countries for U.S.
services like banking, movie and television rights, technology products and other
products, but agricultural products are far down the priority list. Most often,
opening our borders for agricultural imports into the U.S. is the price we pay for
access to their consumer markets.
The U.S. has the largest and most powerful economy on earth. There is
tremendous incentive for countries to enter into trade agreements with us, not
necessarily because they want to buy from us, but because they want to sell to us.
We are the most consumptive society the world has ever known. Trade Promotion
Authority is not the deal breaker. Trade Promotion Authority is just one more in a
long list of items where farmers and ranchers are used to provide political cover for
other interests such as the elimination of estate taxes, vertical integration, and
biotechnology. The bottom line is that TPA is not the answer farmers and ranchers
are looking for.
XIII. WHO REALLY WINS WITH FREE TRADE?
Free trade conventional wisdom assumes that if farmers and ranchers operate
in the free market, the most "efficient" producers will prevail, while the "less
efficient" producers will finally fail when taken off the government dole. Of
course, the problem with this assumption is that it is simply not true. Contrary to
conventional wisdom, it is not the most efficient that will prevail, but rather those
with the deepest pockets who can afford to stay in the game the longest. Economic
theory that maintains countries quit producing agricultural commodities if prices
get low enough is flawed, primarily because other nations view food production as
a national security issue, and will produce food for their citizens regardless of the
price.
Economics assumes that trade takes place between equal entities. It ignores
the fact that the world is filled with those who are unequal in size and strength, and
it ignores that giant corporations are capable of dominating conditions of trade at
the expense of smaller businesses and individuals. That is exactly the case in
agriculture, and it is especially true in the global marketplace.
Eliminating trade barriers, globalizing markets and erasing borders simply
encourages dominant players to grow even larger. At the same time, trade
agreements strive to eliminate the few protections that farmers have left, such as
112. Implementation of Trade Agreements, 19 U.S.C. § 3805 (2008); Dominican Republic -
Central America Free Trade, 19 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4111 (2008).
113. Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, FTAA - Trade Negotiations Committee (Feb. 24,
2005), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document-Library/PressReleases/2005/February/asset-upload-fil8O4- 7 2
82.pdf.
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domestic safety net programs and marketing agencies. Trade agreements also
attempt to dismantle labor standards and environmental protections for all workers.
Fair trade is essential to American agriculture. However, liberalized trade is
not the cure for all of agriculture's woes. Markets fluctuate, currency values
change, trade balances shift, and supply and demand varies. That is the way
markets work. That is why farmers and ranchers need federal farm programs,
antitrust protections, and transparent trade agreements. The nature of the markets,
coupled with the current free market ideology and undue market influence of
international corporations, mean that the present situation in agriculture is not an
aberration but a chronic condition brought to bear upon farmers by our public
policy choices.
XIV. A SENSIBLE ALTERNATIVE
Agriculture is unique. Agricultural markets do not work like other markets,
and food production is too important to be at the mercy of political whim and
corporate wealth building. Agriculture needs public policies and trade agreements
that recognize the realities of agricultural markets. World farmers need to
cooperate, not compete, by fostering new trade rules that:
1. Establish an international food reserve to assure supply when natural
disasters cut production. Exporting and importing nations should
share the cost of the reserve.
2. Recognize that some of our world agricultural production could be
used for energy needs and establish a national or international energy
reserve of commodities that can be processed into energy in times of
lowered production.
3. Attack world hunger and malnutrition: 800 million people in the
world are starving and have suffered with for dozens of years. In
addition, nearly one billion people in the world suffer from varying
levels of malnutrition. Hunger results in an unstable, insecure,
unhealthy and dangerous world.
4. Recognize that agriculture is unique among industries, and that
changes in price do not necessarily change the levels of production.
Agricultural producers will continue to produce all of their acres in
times of low prices in an attempt to cover costs, and will continue to
produce on all of their acres in times of high prices in an attempt to
capitalize on good markets.
5. Recognize that the usual way to grow the amount of export volumes
is to lower the price, and this "race to the bottom" decimates
producers.
6. Recognize that U.S. and world output of agricultural commodities
will continue to outpace demand.
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7. Understand that we must view food and agriculture markets as they
are, and not how we want them to be. 114
Agricultural producers are in a global market that whipsaws food producers
into the fruitless quest to be the lowest cost producers. We need a global market
that rewards farmers for participating in the world's greatest occupation - growing
food.
114. See NATIONAL FARMERS UNION, supra note 1, at 41-47.
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